William & Mary Law Review
Volume 32 (1990-1991)
Issue 4

Article 2

April 1991

Textualism, Constitutionalism, and Federal Statutes
Jerry L. Mashaw

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Repository Citation
Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and Federal Statutes, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
827 (1991), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss4/2
Copyright c 1991 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

William and Mary
Law Review
VOLUME 32

SUMMER 1991

NUMBER 4

TEXTUALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL STATUTES
JERRY L. MASHAW*

I.

THE CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSY OVER STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION

Academic ferment concerning "interpretation" has clearly

reached the "heady brew" stage. And, with particular reference
to statutory interpretation, commentators have recently staked
out positions representing most of the major currents and crosscurrents of legal scholarship. As with most topics that become
"hot" in the law journals, there is thunder on the right," lightning
on the left,2 as well as attempts to do more than muddle in the
middle.3 Yet, whether commentators emphasize the potentially
chaotic or self-interested nature of legislation, 4 the internally
contradictory or radically subjective nature of norms, 5 or the
* Gordon B. Tweedy Professor of Law and Orgamzation, Yale University. BA., Tulane

University, 1962; LL.B., Tulane University, 1964; Ph.D., University of Edinburgh, 1969.
This Essay was first delivered as the George Wythe Lecture at the Marshall-Wythe
School of Law at the College of William and Mary, October 29, 1990, under the title, So
That's What We Meant?:A Legwlator'sGuuLe to the Supreme Court'sNew Constitutionalism
and to the Interpretation of Federal Statuteq. It has benefitted from discussion at the
Faculty Workshop at the University of Michigan Law School.
1. R. POSNEn, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFoRM 261-93 (1985).
2. R. DWoRm, LAw's EmPnE 313-54 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasonzng, 42
STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990); Popkin, The CollaborativeModel of Statutory Interpretation,61
S. CAL. L. REv. 541 (1988).
4. E.g., Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227-33 (1986).
5. E.g., Levmson, Law as Literature,60 TEx. L. REv. 373, 396-403 (1982).

828

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:827

necessity of tradition-based, 6 communitarian, 7 or pragmatic s solutions to interpretive puzzles, one underlying message seems
the same: attempts to link the interpretation of statutes to the
commands of an identifiable legislature are doomed. If we ever
believed in the naive "faithful agent" model of statutory interpretation,9 we can no longer.
Legal academic ferment is often a function of things that are
happening in the world outside the academy-legal innovations
that cause commentators to rethink or gain a different perspective on perennial legal issues. Most of the events mentioned to
this point, however, are part of what I call the "tertiary" legal
literature: a literature prompted largely by the actions or analyses of other commentators who are themselves often developing
legal theory out of ideas and perspectives imported from other
academic fields. ° In this increasingly common literature, commentators use primary legal materials only for illustration, if at
all. Primary legal materials-cases, statutes, regulations, and
administrative adjudications- neither motivate the legal analyses
in the tertiary literature nor supply or reorient the commentator's theoretical perspective.
The return of academic legal commentators to issues of statutory interpretation has occurred, however, concurrently with
another set of disputes over statutory interpretation. These disputes have also engaged legal commentators, but in their traditional reactive mode of responding to the behavior of primary
legal actors, particularly the federal courts and Congress. At the
base of these controversies are potential changes in both the
methodological presuppositions and the substantive commitments
that have previously structured the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of federal statutes.
On the methodological side, a group of doctrines or commitments of three basic types frames the interpretive debate: requirements of clear statement; attachment to "plain meaning"
analysis; and increased deference to administrative agency policy
choice in the absence of explicit statutory direction to the contrary. A brief description of these three domains of new or
revised interpretive approach will explain why commentators
6. Dworkin, Law as Interpretation.60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 540-50 (1982).
7. Fish, Interpretation and the PluralistVision, 60 TEx. L. REV. 495, 498-99 (1982).
8. E.g., J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 31-65 (1982).
9. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415,
460-62 (1989).
10. See, e.g., Eskridge, Gada er/Statutory Interpretation,90 CoLUm. L. REV. 609 (1990).
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sometimes refer to the new doctrines as elements of a "new
textualism" 11 in statutory construction.
Clear statement rules arose primarily in connection with the
determination of whether Congress should attach implied remedies to federal statutes and whether Congress intended to waive
the states' traditional eleventh amendment immunity from suit.12
The doctrinal shift here has been dramatic. Twenty-five years
ago, one might have said with some confidence that, in case of
doubt, federal courts should create private remedies for the
putative beneficiaries of federal regulatory statutes whenever
those remedies would effectuate the broad purposes of a statute.13
Few demands for implied remedies would fail to meet this criterion. Similarly, one might have argued that these extensions
of federal protection were as necessary when the parties acting
contrary to federal law were states and localities as when they
were private actors. Hence, congressional action extending federal rights against those acting "under color of state law"'14 would
almost necessarily entail a concomitant intent to waive eleventh
amendment immunity from suit. 5
In 1990, one can as confidently assert that the interpretive
presuppositions of federal remedial law are precisely to the
contrary. Courts are not to imply rights on federal statutes unless
Congress clearly expresses an intent to do so, usually in the
statute itself.16 The requirements of textual demonstration of
intent are even stronger when claiming that Congress intends to
waive state eleventh amendment immunity.17 Not only are these
changes dramatic, but they tend to exalt the statutory text over
other sources of legislative intent, particularly legislative history.

11. See, e.g., Eskridge, The New Teztualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
12. See discussion in Note, Intent, Clear Statements and the Common Law: Statutory
Interpretationin the Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L. REV. 892 (1982).
13. See JJ. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-35 (1964) (a federal district court has
the power to grant damages or to rescind a corporate merger in a shareholder derivative
suit even though the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is silent concerning specific
remedies).
14. See 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1988).
15. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964) (operation of a railroad in
interstate commerce by the State of Alabama constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity
and consent to suit by employees under the Federal Employees Liability Act).
16. See generally Mashaw, "'Rights"in the FederalAdministrative State, 92 YALE LJ.
1129 (1983); Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and PrivateRights, 95 HARv. L. REV.
1195 (1982).
17. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
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A similar development is evident with respect to the enhancement of agency interpretive power under the so-called Chevron' s
doctrine. The standard teaching of American administrative law
has long been that the interpretation of statutory terms is an
issue of law within the de novo jurisdiction of a reviewing court.19
However much courts might have used prior agency interpretation as a guide, they retained the power to substitute their
interpretive judgment for the judgment of administrative agencies whenever they believed agency constructions were erroneous. Chevron altered this conventional wisdom by asserting that
reviewing courts should defer to the policies that agencies adopt
unless the courts believe that Congress had spoken "to the
precise question at issue."20 To be sure, the Supreme Court
advised reviewing courts not to support agency interpretations
unless the courts believed them to be "reasonable."2' But review
for reasonableness is a far cry from de novo review for correctness. Although the Court required deference by reviewing courts
only in cases in which the congressional intent was not clear, the
opinion in Chevron counsels against overturning an agency decision unless the agency interpretation is contrary to the "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 22
While one might have thought that "unambiguous" expressions
on "precise" questions normally would be available only in the
text of a statute, the Supreme Court in Chevron itself went on
to discuss the legislative and administrative history of the statute.23 The Court, however, found both to be at least as ambiguous
or "unstable" as the text.24 The Court therefore returned to the
language of the statute to determine whether the agency's construction was unreasonable. 25 Finding that the text would bear
the meaning that the agency gave it, the Court counseled the

18. See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-66 (1984).

19. This standard teaching is incorporated in the Administrative Procedure Act's
provision on judicial review, which reads in part: 'To the extent necessary to decision
and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action." 5 U.S.C. S 706 (1988).
20. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
21. Id. at 844.
22. Id at 843.
23. I& at 845-66.
24. Id. at 862-63.
25. Id. at 863-64.
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objecting parties to address their "policy" arguments either to
the agency or to Congress, not to the Court.2 6
Although in later cases the Supreme Court has urged that the
determination of whether a text is "ambiguous" under the Chevron doctrine is a question addressed in terms of the "traditional
tools" of statutory interpretation,2 the third prong of textualism-plain meaning analysis-tends to redefine those tools by
limiting analysis to the examination of statutory texts. Whereas
the plain meaning methodology, as currently employed, does not
exclude aids to interpretation beyond the bare words of the
statute, it has a decided antipathy to the use of prestatutory
materials, materials usually referred to as the "legislative history" of the statute.
As with Chevron deference, to the extent that the Court, or a
majority of the Court, comes to affirm the anti-legislative history
presumptions of the plain meaning approach, it rejects decades
(perhaps a century) of practice to the contrary.28 Notwithstanding
much language in Supreme Court opinions announcing that the
Court always starts with the text, the Court has generally
rejected any strict requirement that courts consult other sources,
and legislative history in particular, only when the text is ambiguous.P Indeed, analysis of legislative history has been such a
routine characteristic of statutory construction in the United
States that some courts have even suggested that putting language in the statute or in the committee reports was largely a
question of "drafting style." °
Outside of confirmation hearings, Congress seldom becomes
involved in methodological disputes concerning statutory interpretation either in the legal literature or in the text of judicial
opinions. The Supreme Court's new textualism, however, has
coincided with substantive developments in the interpretation of
federal law that have sharpened congressional interest. Over the
last decade, Congress has perceived that its political preferences

26. Id. at 864.
27. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).
28. See generally Jones, Eztrinsic Aids in the FederalCourts, 25 IowA L. REV. 737, 737
(1940) (presenting a "critical analysis of the use of extrinsic aids in statutory construction").
29. See, e.g., Wald, Same Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REV. 195, 195 (1983) (stating baldly that "[n]o occasion
for statutory construction now exists when the Court will not look at the legislative
history").
30. See, e.g., Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
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might be at odds with those of an increasingly conservative
Court. Minor controversies have erupted over a number of judicial decisions, but civil rights statutes have been a matter of
continuous concern. In the late 1980's, the Court handed down a
series of decisions concerning workplace discrimination that produced cries of outrage in Congress. In 1990, legislators attempted
to overturn no less than nine of the Supreme Court's recent
antidiscrimination decisions-attempts that failed
given the dy3
namics of partisan politics and the veto power. '
It goes almost without saying that a Congress that has passed
statutes to overturn judicial decisions by majority votes in both
Houses is likely to feel itself frustrated, if not ill-used, by the
Supreme Court and, of course, the President. In 1990, that sense
of frustration led to hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee. The subcommittee sought to determine the
appropriate methodology for interpreting federal statutes and
the techniques, if any, that Congress might use to protect itself
from the misconstruction of its intentions.3 This ferment and
controversy within, between, or among legal institutions prompts
my inquiry into the new textualism, its meaning, and its possible
justification.
II.

So WHAT Is REALLY HAPPENING OUT THERE?

A first question is surely in order: Is textualism dominant, or
at least a major new direction in the approach to statutory
interpretation? My tentative answer is "yes." To be sure, the
clear statement principles that the Court has adopted strongly
emphasize the text as the sole source of guidance. But implied
rights of action and eleventh amendment waiver controversies
are a modest portion of the jurisprudence interpreting federal
statutes. Clear statement requirements hardly dominate the landscape of statutory construction.
The Chevron "agency deference" approach obviously covers
much more ground. Most federal statutes have agency implementors, and much of what agencies do qualifies to some degree as
an interpretation of the governing statutes. Nevertheless, the

31. For a discussion of these developments, see Eskridge, The Court/Congress Dynamics
of Interpreting Civil Rights Statutes (forthcoming).
32. See generally Biskupic, Scalia Takes a Narrow View In Seeking Congress' Will, 1990
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 913-19 (presenting an overview of the growing debate over the

textualist approach to statutory interpretation).
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Chevron approach (which, strictly speaking, applies only to rulemaking), even if generalized to all agency interpretations, will
reinforce textualism only to the extent that the Court or courts
rely on the text as the sole basis for determining ambiguity.
My guess, however, is that text will increasingly dominate this
sort of analysis. Not only is this the general direction that "plain
meaning" presses the court (a question to which we will soon
turn), but this is also an arena in which legislative history is
likely to be insufficiently crystalline to overcome an agency
assertion of power that has plausible grounding in the statutory
language. Cases pitting agency interpretations against clear legislative history are rare. Agencies do not notoriously fail to honor
congressional intent embodied in legislative history. Indeed, their
affection for discerning congressional intent through legislative
history has given rise to the Washington aphorism, "Federal
administrative agencies consult the text of statutes only to the
extent that the legislative history is ambiguous."
Whatever the reach of clear statement principles or the capacities of Chevron deference to exalt text over other interpretive
sources, the plain meaning approach clearly has that capacity
and applies to the whole of statutory interpretation jurisprudence. The question then is to what extent the Court is now, or
is soon likely to be, wedded to that approach.
Only Justices Scalia and Kennedy seem firmly attached to the
plain meaning approach, but they are often joined in plain meaning opinions by the Chief Justice and by Justices White and
O'Connor. Given the ideological affinities of these Justices on
substantive issues, the extent of methodological agreement is
hard to discern. Commentators have found a statistically small
shift in the Court's use of plain meaning methodology over the
last few terms, and its use has been at the expense of routine
utilization of legislative history to bolster textual analysis. Yet,
the numbers are too small and the shifts too minor to argue that
a major change has taken place.
One should not discount, however, the way in which the dynamics of majority-making may push litigants, lower courts, and
other Justices in the direction staked out by Justices Scalia and
Kennedy. After all, there are two votes to be had by emphasizing
strong textual analysis. This emphasis may not cause others to
abandon all use of legislative history, but it is likely to press

33. See Eskridge, supra note 11, at 656-60.
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both their analyses and their rhetoric in the direction of an
increasing focus on text.
The ideological convergence of plain meaning methodology and
the conservative wing of the Court leads to another obvious
question: Is this retreat to the text merely a conservative plot
to undermine liberal statutes? Some evidence obviously suggests
an affirmative response. The 1990 political imbroglio concerning
the Court's restrictive interpretation of civil rights statutes is a
case in point, but plenty of contrary evidence exists as well.
The Chevron approach, for example, leads to a conventionally
liberal position; it supports the broad policy discretion of the
implementors of the positive or welfare state. Indeed, the Court
seems to have written its opinion in Chevron as if to drive the
last nail in the sporadically reopened casket of the nondelegation
doctrine. With this firm rejection of the nondelegation doctrine
go many conservatives' hopes for constitutional retrenchment on
the burgeoning administrative state.
Nevertheless, here, as elsewhere, "methodology" could lose its
more general political coloration when assessed in a particular
substantive context. Deference to agency policy judgments can
be either a liberal extension of the power of the welfare state in
liberal administrations or a license for retrenchment in situations
in which conservative administrators are dominant. Hence, one
could claim that Chevron takes a position that plays into the
hands of conservatives in a polity that in recent decades has
featured a conservative President facing a more liberal Congress.
To make out that case, however, one would have to say much
more about effective presidential power over both the executive
branch and independent regulatory agencies and about the patterns of agency statutory interpretation in particular periods.
34. The Court in Chevron ended its opinion with this striking, penultimate paragraph:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political
branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing
political interests, but not on the basis of the judges personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon
the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments.
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive
is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government
to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in
light of everyday realities.
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
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Moreover, because the Chevron approach leaves open the possibility that a reviewing court will view an administrator's significant change of direction as unreasonable, this is not a conservative
strategy that leaves a more liberally oriented lower federal
judiciary without tools to restrain revisionist administrators.
And, of course, should a liberal enter the White House again,
the Chevron methodology works in favor of that executive as
well.
Hence, one should probably imagine that the same methodological commitments can lead in either liberal or conservative
substantive directions depending on many other contextual factors. Indeed, one finds Justice Scalia, both the high priest of the
new textualism and a traditional conservative, being led to conventionally liberal results by his attachment to the plain meaning
methodology.3 5 Moreover, because the liberal wing of the Court
joined Scalia in many of these cases whereas his conservative
colleagues abandoned him, these opinions may also evidence that
Scalia has the strongest attachment to textualism as a purely
interpretive methodology.
In assessing the new textualism, therefore, we should do better
to attempt to think about new textualism in its own terms, rather
than merely as a part of strategic warfare, either internal to the
Court or between the Court and the Congress (and sometimes
involving the executive branch as well). Furthermore, when looked
at as a methodological premise or set of premises, a quite different set of issues comes into focus. To put the matter pejoratively,
do not clear statement rules, requirements that courts find statutes unambiguous in order to constrain agency discretion, and
the restriction of interpretive inquiry to the "plain meaning" of
words describe a disfunctionally "acontextual" view of the power
of language? Will not the "new textualism" inevitably tie us to
a rigid, text-based view of law, thereby producing outdated
statutes and poorly informed interpretive results?
I am not at all convinced that we should so easily dismiss
textualism. First, we should be clear that this approach does not
exclude all other "contexts" except the syntax of the words in
question. Indeed, it could not if it tried. The real danger of this
view is its necessary reliance on contexts that the methodology
apparently makes nondiscussable. Yet, outside of the clear statement rule cases, the Court, even when espousing the plain mean-

35. See Eskridge, supra note 11, at 669 n.193.
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ing approach, explicitly puts the statutory language in several
potentially revealing contexts. Those contexts include the statute
as a whole (including its overall structure and purposes); the
prior structure, purposes, and language of other statutes in
related areas; administrative interpretations implementing the
statute; and prior judicial constructions of the statute. Hence,
while eschewing legislative history, but even letting it in when
all else fails, the plain meaning rule as applied to date has not
been acontextual.8
Moreover, the exclusion of legislative history is more likely to
increase the flexibility of statutes than to render them static or
rigid. After all, inquiry is directed necessarily away from prestatutory history and toward later text including administrative
decisions, judicial decisions, and later statutes. Suppressing the
working documents, or travaux preparatoires,of codes or constitutions is a common technique for ensuring that texts have a
long, useful life. Thus were the records of our own Constitutional
Convention suppressed, as were the working documents respecting most Western civil codes.3
The association of working document suppression with increased textual flexibility is a function of linguistic convention.
Studies of language over the last decade refined, if not revolutionized, our understanding of the way language concepts are
constructed. The basic building blocks of language, that is, those
concepts around which we organize most of our information, seem
not to be the most concrete or rudimentary images, but instead
appear to be midlevel concepts.3 8 For example, one learns and
tends to organize the world more around concepts like "cat" than
around the more abstract "animal" or the more concrete and
particularistic "tiger."3 9 We think and speak more of "automo40
biles" than of either "vehicles" or "sport coupes."
One can expect these linguistic conventions to be followed in
situations in which statements are oral and the context of utterance is not radically unconventional. As one looks at statutory
expressions, however, one is struck by the degree to which
statutes organize information with either core concepts or concepts at the next higher level of abstraction. By contrast, talk

36. See id. at 656-66.
37. See id. at 666-68.
38. See, e.g., G. LAKOFF,

WOMEN, FIm
REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 31-57 (1987).

39. Id. at 46-50.
40. Id.

AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES
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on the floor of legislatures, or even in committee meetings, is
likely to be by reference to core concepts and a set of examples
or a principal case that is more concrete. Take an example with
which I have recently become intimately familiar: 41 legislators
addressing safety legislation talk about cars or particularly troublesome models (remember the Corvair?); the statutes they draft
speak of "motor vehicles." 42 Congressmen talk of seatbelts or
airbags, but motor vehicle legislation speaks of "occupant protection" or "passive restraints."4
Hence, it seems reasonable to presume that the language of
statutes will be systematically more inclusive than the language
of legislative histories. The language of statutes will therefore
give statutes greater flexibility and reach unless construed to
include only those examples or concrete cases that legislative
discussions specifically called to mind. To be sure, legislatures
draft civil codes and constitutions with this need for abstraction
self-consciously in mind. But this use of abstract concepts is the
tendency of statutory formulation as a whole.
Nevertheless, we might ask whether the new textualism does
not cut us off from some potentially useful sources of data about
meaning, legislative history in particular, that could be adverted
to without loss and with some possibility of gain. On that question
I will pass, for now. By analogy to a familiar theorem of welfare
economics, it seems trivially true that interpreters should be
better able to give an accurate or an appropriate meaning to a
statute by using all possible sources of instruction rather than
by using only some of them. Yet, scholars also widely believe
that some sorts of evidence, although potentially enlightening,
are nevertheless so likely to be misleading that the errors induced
more than offset the potential gains of the evidence. Stories
emphasizing the reliability or the treachery of legislative history
are so plausible that I find it difficult to choose among them.
And my purpose here is not to attempt to adjudicate a dispute
about the accuracy of one or another interpretive techniques.
Interestingly enough, the reasons given for the new textualism
by its most vigorous judicial proponent 44 have often had to do,
not with the usefulness of extrinsic evidence, but with the con-

41. See J. MAsHAw & D. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY paSSim (1990).

42. See id. at 47-58.
48. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.
amended by Act of Oct. 27, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-492 (1974).
44. See Eskridge, supra note 11, at 650-56.

SS 1381-1431 (1966), as
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stitutional appropriateness of using evidence outside the text to
aid interpretation. 45 The case to be made for clear statement
principles," Chevron deference, 47 or the plain meaning rule seems
to be a case more about constitutional values than interpretive
accuracy. To that degree, I think the case for textualism is being
made in exactly the right way.
III.

THE CASE FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INTERPRETATION

Most of the words in the majority of statutes cause no interpretive difficulty. They all may be potentially troublesome, but
situations never arise to cast doubt on a conventional reading
shared by literally everyone who encounters the text. For these
nonproblematic words, methodology is of no moment. Choose any
methodology you want; it will lead you in the same direction.
Our concern in statutory interpretation, then, is always with
words that have somehow become troublesome. They suggest
different things to different readers, and an argument must be
made about how to read the text. In law, when we give an
authoritative interpretation, that is, one that is to be backed by
the authority and power of the State, we presume interpretation
is efficacious whether it is the true or the best or the most
correct understanding of the text. In our law, however, the
exercise of a power to speak authoritatively as an interpreter
carries with it an obligation to explain the grounds upon which
the interpreter gives that authoritative judgment. 48 If we begin
with the notion that giving such reasons will occur to us only in
circumstances in which different approaches produce different
results, the argument moves back a step. We, or the authoritative
interpreter, must be able to state why some particular approach

45. Id. at 653-56.
46. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237-47 (1985) (giving a
series of constitutional reasons to require the clearest possible expression of congressional
intention to abrogate state immunity); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
730-49 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (finding remedies not expressed in the statute invades
the congressional power).
47. See supra note 34.
48. I make this statement knowing full well that one cannot find this proposition stated
so boldly save, perhaps, by dissenting Justices. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 587-92 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (demanding that the government justify
the denial of any government job with sound reasons). Nevertheless, the statement makes
sense of much of our practice and lies behind the relentless demands by courts that
officials explain the bases for their actions. See also Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560,
568-72 (1975) (demanding an explanation of a decision that the Court seemingly had no
power otherwise to control).
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to reason-giving is a legitimate way to give authoritative meaning
to the words of the text.
In my view, the only way to ground such a methodological
commitment, even to such seemingly noncontroversial ideas as
the notion that interpretation should lend coherence to the law,
is through constitutional argument. To put the matter another
way, we must ground all methodological commitments in the
Constitution before we can recognize them as legitimate. By this
I mean simply that it must be possible to explain, by relying
explicitly on some vision of the constitutional polity, why that
method of interpretation is appropriate for that interpreter with
respect to that text.
I make this claim, not because it is anywhere so written, nor
because it appears to be generally accepted, but because I cannot
discern any other way to argue about the methodology of interpretation that would legitimate any particular approach. To return, for example, to the notion of lending coherence to the law,
one cannot rest with the simple assertion that coherence of the
legal order is a good thing. One has to go on to say why coherence
is important to a legal order-meaning a constitutional orderlike ours. After all, in a despotic legal order, incoherence might
be a good way for tyrants to keep their subjects off balance.
To be sure, the requirement that methodological commitment
be grounded in constitutional argument only moves the conversation back one more step. We must then argue about how to
interpret the Constitution, or more broadly, how to understand
the constitutional order. I do not mean to claim that legitimate
methodological grounding is easy or that it leads inexorably to
consensus about either interpretive methodology or particular
decisions. Indeed, I mean quite the opposite. I want to argue
only that although we have no way to decide definitively on the
best interpretive methodology, it is always essential to claim,
and when contested, to argue about, the constitutional legitimacy
of the methodology we utilize.
To some degree, this idea is familiar. 49 After all, we expect
courts occasionally to invoke the "canon of interpretation" that
statutes should be interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties.
The invocation of "legislative supremacy" in judicial decisions
interpreting and applying statutes is ubiquitous. These are not,

49. Indeed, both Cass Sunstein and I have argued this point before. See Mashaw, As
If Republican Interpretation.,97 YAL L.J. 1685 (1988); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in
the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405 (1989).
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however, the sorts of constitutional groundings for the methodological commitments that I am envisioning. The canon urging
avoidance of constitutional difficulties is itself radically incomplete and perhaps incoherent. A court that sustains and applies
a statute interpreted by reference to this canon surely shows no
greater solicitude for legislative preferences than does a court
that attempts to understand what was meant and then engages
in a serious constitutional analysis of the validity of the statute.
After all, sustaining and applying a statute that Congress never
intended to enact is hardly a lesser usurpation of the legislative
power than is overturning a statute on constitutional grounds.
Indeed, because the Constitution warrants the latter and not the
former, this seems to be a constitutional canon in grave need of
either refurbishing or rejection.50
One can say the same about the standard eighth grade civics
invocations of "legislative supremacy." That the legislature is
supreme does not assist in understanding what the invocation
means. Moreover, the proposition that the legislature is supreme
in the United States constitutional system is simply false. If there
is any substance to these homilies about legislative supremacy,
we must further develop these concepts before we can understand
how they articulate or ground an appropriate interpretive methodology.
I nevertheless believe that revealing and confronting the constitutional bases for interpretive norms is a move in the right
direction. To the extent that the Supreme Court, in enunciating
its new textualist principles, is driven in that direction-or moves
there without coercion-it is engaging in an activity that should
be applauded.
Given more time and space, I might here attempt to persuade
you further that the provision of a constitutional formulation for
interpretive methodology is what the battle over legislative interpretation is necessarily about. One way to do this, and I
believe it can be done, would be to show that every interpretive
theory offered in the large and growing contemporary literature
on statutory interpretation is either "foundational" in this sense
or unpersuasive. That applies to pragmatists and other antifoun-

50. For similarly unhappy views of this canon, see R. POSNER, sUpra note 1, at 285
(arguing that this canon enlarges the number of constitutional prohibitions beyond the
most extravagant modern interpretations of the Constitution). But see Sunstein, supra
note 49, at 469 (arguing that the canon promotes protection of "underenforced" constitutional rights).
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dationalists too. This subject, however, is a task for another
essay.
IV.

THE EXTENT AND LIMITS OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM

The question that this Essay must address as we move toward
its close is this: Is our increasingly textualist Supreme Court
getting the constitutional law right? Are its methodological commitments not only legitimately grounded in the Constitution, but
also grounded in a persuasive vision of the constitutional order?
Whether the Court is getting the constitutional law right is, of
course, infinitely debatable, but I find myself increasingly sympathetic with some of the basic approaches that the Justices
have developed.
Let us begin with what seems to be the most well-articulated
case: the Court's progressive limitations on implying rights of
action on federal statutes absent a clear textual basis for the
implication. 51 Indeed, this movement can be explained in terms
of four different ideas, all of which are of constitutional moment.
The first idea is legislative supremacy, but not of a naive or
unqualified sort. After all, an interpretive rule that says, "We
will assume, unless otherwise instructed, that Congress prefers
that courts develop remedies where they seem needed," is just
as respectful of congressional power as a rule taking the opposite
position. Abstractly considered, any firm baseline will do.
Apparently, however, the style of federal statutes has changed
markedly over the course of the twentieth century. Whereas
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Congresses sometimes
enacted legislation containing only primary rules of conduct with
no implementing apparatus or remedial instructions, 52 late twentieth-century Congresses are highly attentive to remedial and
procedural detail.53 Hence, although any baseline proposition ab51. See generally Mashaw, "Rights" in the FederalAdministrative State, 92 YALE L.J.
1129 (1983).
52. See, e.g., Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1886, ch. 929, § 3, 24 Stat. 310,
329-30 (1887) (current version at 33 U.S.C. S 441 (1990)) (prohibiting the throwing of any
refuse matter into New York Harbor but providing no penalties or remedies for what

the statute makes "unlawful").
53. Indeed, Congress may be so attentive to remedial structures that the Court is
unwilling to preserve explicit remedies found in more general statutes, Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1981), or in state or
federal common law, Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317-32 (1981), unless explicitly
preserved by the federal regulatory statute in question, International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497-500 (1987).
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stractly satisfies a demand that the Supreme Court honor clear
legislative expressions, it has seemed more and more likely in
recent years that Congress was attending to remedial issues.
In this context, respect for legislative supremacy may include
adopting baseline interpretive principles that reduce the burden
on legislative corrective action. Whereas respect for legislative
supremacy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (perhaps up until the last two or three decades) probably entailed
judicial remedial creativity, asserting that a different rule now
better fits the facts is fair. The case is not overwhelming, but it
is surely sensible.
Second, the increasing creation and use of complex regulatory
or administrative machinery in modern statutes strongly suggests
a congressional purpose to move implementation out of the hands
of ordinary litigants and generalist courts. In the Court's clear
statement principle concerning implied rights of action, a plausible purpose thus exists to avoid interference with the exercise
of regulatory and prosecutorial discretion by those to whom
Congress has delegated enforcement authority. Indeed, implied
rights of action are radically discontinuous with such a purpose
in many circumstances. We may believe that the putative beneficiaries of these statutes would be better off if rights of action
were more generally implied. That, however, is not an answer
to the claim that Congress seems often to compromise its substantive aspirations via procedural details- 4
Third, implication of remedies on federal statutes has quite
different constitutional connotations than does state court use of
statutory norms as per se rules in deciding contract or tort
claims. Each implication of a remedy on a federal statute is
simultaneously the creation of a right and the creation of federal
question jurisdiction to adjudicate that right. Federal courts thus
have a different, indeed, almost opposite, position in developing
remedies on federal statutes than do generalist state courts with
respect to fleshing out common law actions through the selective
incorporation of statutory norms. Moreover, the Supreme Court

54. Although I would dispute any claim that a congressional desire to mold the direction
of administrative behavior principallyexplains administrative procedure in general, there
is surely much to the idea that desires to reign in potentially wayward bureaucrats often
motivate the procedures that Congress adopts legislatively. Effectuating this desire for
political control is quite inconsistent with a highly decentralized enforcement mechanism,
such as private law suits which might be brought in either federal or state courts. See
generally Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process:Normative, Positive, and Critical
Stories of Legal Development, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267 (1990).
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has clearly observed, through some years of experimentation,
that its concerns about judicial aggrandizement-at the expense
of either legislative remedial discretion or executive or administrative prosecutorial discretion-is not shared uniformly, and
perhaps not even widely, by the lower federal judiciary. Given
the limited number of cases that the Supreme Court can itself
subject to supervisory review, a bright line rule-the clear statement principle-may well have seemed necessary in order to
make the Supreme Court's vision of separation of powers effective.55
Finally, one must recognize that every implication of a remedy
on a federal statute will tend to displace some segment of state
common or statutory law. As federal statutes come to inhabit
more and more of the regulatory space that previously was
populated only by state common law rules or, perhaps, state
regulatory systems, the process of implication obviously affects
the preservation of state authority. Of course, this federalism
argument can run both ways. Federalism entails both a proper
respect for subnational political prerogative and a proper respect
for uniform national policy. Once again, however, there is a
reasonable position that urges caution in the displacement of
state power in situations in which Congress has not done so
explicitly.
None of these arguments is airtight. Together, however, they
suggest a posture about the implication of private remedies on
federal statutes that is respectful of diverse aspects of the
constitutional order. It may not be the correct or the best view.
Nevertheless, that posture grounds a methodological commitment
to restrictive interpretation of federal statutes in constitutional
values that those who believe that the commitment is wrongheaded can expose and debate. These constitutionally oriented
arguments respond to the question why this court takes that
approach with respect to those issues in a way that legitimates
its stance, even while the correctness of the court's position is
disputed.
Constitutional reasons of a different sort are given for suppressing the use of legislative history in interpretation. The
primary, articulate reason is the protection of the values of
bicameralism and presentment which were at the heart of the

55. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-49 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court's implication of a right of action that Congress did not clearly
authorize denigrates the democratic process).
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Court's opinion in INS v. Chadha.5 In short, the argument is that
continuous and constant referral to legislative history tends to
engage the Court in the interpretation of texts-committee reports or the utterances of various senators and representativesthat have never been enacted by both Houses of Congress or
presented to the President.
Like Chadha itself, this constitutionalist rationale is open to
serious challenge. Courts presumably use legislative history as
evidence of legislative intent, not as a substitute for the text.
Moreover, courts may preserve the "process fairness" or "equal
respect" values of bicameralism and presentment by making
certain that they consider the legislative history in both Houses
of Congress and further by giving "legislative history" status to
the signing statements of presidents or to other presidential or
executive branch communications in connection with the progress
57
of a bill through Congress.
These objections, however, may miss the point. To be sure,
courts often investigate and rely on legislative history only as
evidence, not as text. It is child's play, however, to find cases
that articulate long lines of jurisprudence on the basis of language
that has been conjured up from the legislative history and that
appears nowhere in the statutes.8
Moreover, although considering the legislative history made in
both Houses of Congress and by presidential utterances would
produce a "level playing field," achieving that result is not
necessarily the point of the Chadha approach. The textualist
views the enterprise of giving meaning through interpretation
not as the carrying out of a collective intent that everyone had
a fair chance to shape, but as the authoritative application of a
text that has an appropriate constitutional pedigree. The power
of interpretation is, after all, the power to use the coercive means
of the state to shape human behavior.
In the formalist view of the Constitution, the state cannot
exercise that coercive power save as it is called upon to adjudicate the meaning of an authoritative document. To use legislative
history to generate a legislative intent that is then enforced

56. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
57. For a fuller discussion, see Eskridge, supra note 11, at 670-78.
58. Labor law doctrine concerning "managerial employees," for example, endlessly
debates the meaning of a term that appears nowhere in the statutes governing collective
bargaining. For a window into this jurisprudence, see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267 (1974) (holding that Congress intended to exclude all "managerial employees"
from the protections of the National Labor Relations Act).
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through judicial implementation is to engage in an unconstitutional practice. As modern political and interpretive theories
rightly and constantly claim, we will never know the intent of
the legislature. But in answering the question, "By what right
. . " which is the fundamental question to be asked about

authoritative legal interpretation, textualists would argue that
courts and other official interpreters must at least assure us that
they are wielding a power embodied in authoritative texts. Otherwise, at least in our constitutional culture, their pronouncements do not demand assent.
Once again, these points are disputable, as is any constitutional
analysis. But there are arguments here that we can take seriously. They ask the right questions about interpretive methodology, not "Who is right?" or "What is best?"- questions that
we shall never answer. The issue instead is, "What is constitutionally legitimate?" And in a polity such as ours, only the
attempt to ask and answer these questions keeps interpreters
within the constraints of law. In this sense, the "new textualism"
lies both at the cutting edge of interpretive theory and at the
heart of constitutionalism.

